Abstract
Abstract—Information-centric networks struggle with content poisoning attacks (CPAs), especially their stronger form called Fake Data CPA, in which an intruder publisher uploads content signed with stolen credentials. Following an existing graphinfection based approach leveraging the constrained time when stolen credentials are useful, we design a blockchain-based mitigation scheme for Named Data Networking architectures. We postulate Proof-of-Time verification to distinguish between intruder and legitimate publishers, and argue that blockchain solutions can implement it natively. The proposed scheme, using the Federated Byzantine Agreement protocol, is described in detail and found to be a valuable alternative to the graph infection approach, superior with respect to outcome determinism, resiliency, and fault tolerance.
Citations
-
5
CrossRef
-
0
Web of Science
-
4
Scopus
Authors (2)
Cite as
Full text
full text is not available in portal
Keywords
Details
- Category:
- Conference activity
- Type:
- publikacja w wydawnictwie zbiorowym recenzowanym (także w materiałach konferencyjnych)
- Language:
- English
- Publication year:
- 2020
- Bibliographic description:
- Barański S., Konorski J.: Mitigation of Fake Data Content Poisoning Attacks in NDN via Blockchain// / : , 2020,
- DOI:
- Digital Object Identifier (open in new tab) 10.1109/itnac50341.2020.9315048
- Sources of funding:
-
- przedłużona umowa realizacji projektu NCN , zadanie 032657
- Verified by:
- Gdańsk University of Technology
seen 139 times