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Abstract
In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations’ QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce their dissatisfaction with the perceived QoS. If such a threat fails, a costly data frame jamming defense can be launched. We analyze the arising noncooperative game in which the attackers decide whether to continue a TRA when threatened and honest stations decide whether to start jamming when the TRA is continued. Using a Maynard Smith setting, we prove that the threats are credible to a rational attacker, who will then refrain from playing the game and remain honest.
Citations
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Authors (2)
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Szymon Szott
- AGH Wydział Informatyki, Elektroniki i Telekomunikacji
Cite as
Full text
- Publication version
- Accepted or Published Version
- DOI:
- Digital Object Identifier (open in new tab) 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2639483
- License
- Copyright (2016 IEEE)
Keywords
Details
- Category:
- Articles
- Type:
- artykuł w czasopiśmie wyróżnionym w JCR
- Published in:
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IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS
no. 21,
pages 624 - 627,
ISSN: 1089-7798 - Language:
- English
- Publication year:
- 2017
- Bibliographic description:
- Konorski J., Szott S.: Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs// IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS. -Vol. 21, nr. 3 (2017), s.624-627
- DOI:
- Digital Object Identifier (open in new tab) 10.1109/lcomm.2016.2639483
- Verified by:
- Gdańsk University of Technology
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