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Abstrakt
In multi-hop ad hoc networks, selfish nodes may unduly acquire high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. Such traffic remapping attacks (TRAs) are cheap to launch, impossible to prevent, hard to detect, and harmful to non-selfish nodes. While studied mostly in single-hop wireless network settings, TRAs have resisted analysis in multi-hop settings. In this paper we offer a game-theoretic approach: we derive a formal model of opportunistic TRAs, define a TRA game with a heuristic rank-based payoff function, and propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy that both selfish and non-selfish nodes are free to use. Thus non-selfish nodes are allowed to respond in kind to selfish ones. We characterize the form of equilibrium that the multistage play reaches and verify via simulation that it often coincides with a Nash equilibrium in which harmful TRAs are curbed in the first place, whereas harmless ones need not be.
Cytowania
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Web of Science
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Autorzy (2)
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Szymon Szott
- AGH Kraków
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Pełna treść
- Wersja publikacji
- Accepted albo Published Version
- Licencja
- Copyright (2017 IEEE)
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Informacje szczegółowe
- Kategoria:
- Aktywność konferencyjna
- Typ:
- materiały konferencyjne indeksowane w Web of Science
- Tytuł wydania:
- IEEE GLOBECOM 2017 Conference Proceedings strony 1 - 7
- Język:
- angielski
- Rok wydania:
- 2017
- Opis bibliograficzny:
- Konorski J., Szott S..: Modeling a Traffic Remapping Attack Game in a Multi-hop Ad Hoc Network, W: IEEE GLOBECOM 2017 Conference Proceedings, 2017, ,.
- DOI:
- Cyfrowy identyfikator dokumentu elektronicznego (otwiera się w nowej karcie) 10.1109/glocom.2017.8253959
- Weryfikacja:
- Politechnika Gdańska
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