Abstrakt
In a generic setting subsuming communication networks, resource sharing systems, and multi-agent communities, a client generates objects of various classes carrying class-dependent signatures, to which a server assigns class-dependent service quality. A Fake VIP attack consists in false declaration of a high class, with an awareness that detection of object signature at the server side is costly and so invoked reluctantly. We show that such attacks can be mitigated by a server-side double-blind repu-tation scheme. We offer a minimum-information framework for Fake VIP attacks and a stochastic analysis of a two-player Stackelberg game to find optimum attack and defense strategies, as well as to identify regions of operation where both the client and the server find the reputation scheme beneficial.
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Pełna treść
- Wersja publikacji
- Accepted albo Published Version
- Licencja
- Copyright (2017 IEEE)
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Informacje szczegółowe
- Kategoria:
- Aktywność konferencyjna
- Typ:
- materiały konferencyjne indeksowane w Web of Science
- Tytuł wydania:
- Proceedings of the 27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC) strony 1 - 8
- Język:
- angielski
- Rok wydania:
- 2017
- Opis bibliograficzny:
- Konorski J..: Fake VIP Attacks and Their Mitigation via Double-Blind Reputation, W: Proceedings of the 27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC), 2017, ,.
- DOI:
- Cyfrowy identyfikator dokumentu elektronicznego (otwiera się w nowej karcie) 10.1109/atnac.2017.8215385
- Weryfikacja:
- Politechnika Gdańska
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