Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs
In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations’ QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce their dissatisfaction with the perceived QoS. If such a threat fails, a costly data frame jamming defense can be launched. We analyze the arising noncooperative game in which the attackers decide whether to continue a TRA when threatened and honest stations decide whether to start jamming when the TRA is continued. Using a Maynard Smith setting, we prove that the threats are credible to a rational attacker, who will then refrain from playing the game and remain honest.
Jerzy Konorski, Szymon Szott. (2017). Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs, 21(3), 624-627. https://doi.org/10.1109/lcomm.2016.2639483
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