Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs

Abstrakt

In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations’ QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce their dissatisfaction with the perceived QoS. If such a threat fails, a costly data frame jamming defense can be launched. We analyze the arising noncooperative game in which the attackers decide whether to continue a TRA when threatened and honest stations decide whether to start jamming when the TRA is continued. Using a Maynard Smith setting, we prove that the threats are credible to a rational attacker, who will then refrain from playing the game and remain honest.

Cytowania

0
CrossRef
0
Web of Science
0
Scopus

Informacje szczegółowe

Kategoria: Publikacja w czasopiśmie
Typ: artykuł w czasopiśmie wyróżnionym w JCR
Opublikowano w: IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS nr 21, strony 624 - 627,
ISSN: 1089-7798
Język: angielski
Rok wydania: 2017
Opis bibliograficzny: Konorski J., Szott S.: Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs// IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS. -Vol. 21, nr. 3 (2017), s.624-627
DOI: 10.1109/lcomm.2016.2639483
wyświetlono 12 razy
Meta Tagi